Same-sex marriage/partnership in Europe

Two days ago the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), which is part of the Council of Europe (not the European Union!) and judges the implementation of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms issued its most recent judgment on same-sex marriage. It is an important decision in many regards and should be analysed in detail to understand where same-sex marriage is going in Europe.

The European Court of Human Rights is a powerful court and its decisions are in general taken very seriously. Although some countries (Russia for example) have at times flounted the Court’s decisions, this is rather an exception to the rule. Moreover, in Estonia for example ECtHR case-law is usually considered as part of (or even superceding) our constitutional law. It is referenced in Supreme Court decisions and used a lot in legal analysis. Therefore any judgment of the ECtHR is indirectly an important addition to Estonian law as well.

It should be mentioned that the ECtHR case-law applies in 47 countries from Azerbaijan to United Kingdom, from Russia to Iceland (full list of signatories). All European Union Member States are a part of the Convention and EU treaties (its constitutional framework) also have great regard to the Convention. One needs to keep in mind that whereas the Court of Justice of the European Union only settles disputes relating to EU law for EU Member States (27 in total), the ECtHR has to be mindful of 47 different countries with diverse cultural backgrounds and attitudes.

That being said, the ECtHR has been innovative in its intrepretation of the Convention. It has refused to stay within the original meaning of the Convention and has used teleological or functional intrepretation (not strictly looking at the text, but the general purpose of the Convention), looking at the Convention as a ‘living document’.

Coming to Thursday’s judgment in the case of Schalk and Kopf v Austria there are several important aspects that should be highlighted and which also give some ideas about future developments. The case involved an Austrian same-sex couple who complained to the ECtHR that their rights have been infringed under the Convention because Austria has not allowed them to marry each other. In Austria, the law specficially states that marriage is for two persons of the opposite sex (a provision that has been unchanged since 1812), and from 1 January 2010 there is a new law allowing registered partnerships only for same-sex couples. The rights under the Registered Partnerships Act resemble those of the rights for married couples.

The applicants claimed the violation of several articles of the Convention. The most obvious one is Article 12, which provides for the right to marry and to found a family:

Men and women of marriageable age have the right to marry and to found a family, according to the national laws governing the exercise of this right.

In its application of the article and subsequent case  law, the Court first found that wording of the article and intention in the 1950s was not to include the option of same-sex marriage. It went on to state that it cannot depart from that meaning unless there has been a significant social change in majority of states:

Although, as it noted in Christine Goodwin, the institution of marriage has undergone major social changes since the adoption of the Convention, the Court notes that there is no European consensus regarding same-sex marriage. At present no more than six out of forty-seven Convention States allow same-sex marriage (p.58)

The Court then analysed the issue in context of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights and its commentaries, which became binding on EU Member States 1 December 2009. In Article 9 of the Charter, reference to men and women were dropped, but commentary of it states that it is not meant to provide the right of same-sex marriage to all MS. The Court therefore held that there is no obligation for the state coming from Article 12 to provide the right to same-sex marriage, but did not completely exclude same-sex marriage from the application of Article 12 either:

Regard being had to Article 9 of the Charter, therefore, the Court would no longer consider that the right to marry enshrined in Article 12 must in all circumstances be limited to marriage between two persons of the opposite sex. Consequently, it cannot be said that Article 12 is inapplicable to the applicants’ complaint. However, as matters stand, the question whether or not to allow same-sex marriage is left to regulation by the national law of the Contracting State. (p.61)

The applicant also claimed that their right to family life under Article 8 was violated and they were discriminated against under Article 14, because prior to Registered Partnerships Act there were no possibility to have their relationship recognised by the state. There the Court took a large step forward. It had previously held that same-sex relationships were a matter of private life, not family life. However, emphasising the rapid advancement of same-sex partnerships and marriage in Europe, the Court changed its position:

94. In view of this evolution the Court considers it artificial to maintain the view that, in contrast to a different-sex couple, a same-sex couple cannot enjoy “family life” for the purposes of Article 8. Consequently the relationship of the applicants, a cohabiting same-sex couple living in a stable de facto partnership, falls within the notion of “family life”, just as the relationship of a different-sex couple in the same situation would.

Regarding discrimination and whether there could be discrimination between same-sex and opposite-sex couples (one can only discriminate between people if they are in “relevantly similar situations”), the Court stated that:

99.  While the parties have not explicitly addressed the issue whether the applicants were in a relevantly similar situation to different-sex couples, the Court would start from the premise that same-sex couples are just as capable as different-sex couples of entering into stable committed relationships. Consequently, they are in a relevantly similar situation to a different-sex couple as regards their need for legal recognition and protection of their relationship.

The Court took the practical approach and stated that because Austria had provided the registered partnership option, it can only be at fault if it did so too late. The Court stated:

105.  The Court cannot but note that there is an emerging European consensus towards legal recognition of same-sex couples. Moreover, this tendency has developed rapidly over the past decade. Nevertheless, there is not yet a majority of States providing for legal recognition of same-sex couples. The area in question must therefore still be regarded as one of evolving rights with no established consensus, where States must also enjoy a margin of appreciation in the timing of the introduction of legislative changes.

106.  The Austrian Registered Partnership Act, which entered into force on 1 January 2010, reflects the evolution described above and is thus part of the emerging European consensus. Though not in the vanguard, the Austrian legislator cannot be reproached for not having introduced the Registered Partnership Act any earlier.

This should give pause for thought to all those European states which still do not provide any legal recognition of same-sex relationships. By citing the “emerging European consensus” the Court could conceivably pave the way to in not too distant future saying that the consensus has emerged. The fact that the Court might be on the way to finding that should be evidenced also by the close four to three vote on finding no violation of the Article. In their dissenting opinion judges Rozakis, Spielmann and Jebens stated that they considered that there indeed was a violation of Article 14 together with Article 8 in this case:

8. Having identified a “relevantly similar situation” (paragraph 99), and emphasised that “differences based on sexual orientation require particularly serious reasons by way of justification” (paragraph 97), the Court should have found a violation of Article 14 taken in conjunction with Article 8 of the Convention because the respondent Government did not advance any argument to justify the difference of treatment, relying in this connection mainly on their margin of appreciation (paragraph 80). However, in the absence of any cogent reasons offered by the respondent Government to justify the difference of treatment, there should be no room to apply the margin of appreciation. Consequently, the “existence or non-existence of common ground between the laws of the Contracting States” (paragraph 98) is irrelevant as such considerations are only a subordinate basis for the application of the concept of the margin of appreciation. Indeed, it is only in the event that the national authorities offer grounds for justification that the Court can be satisfied, taking into account the presence or the absence of a common approach, that they are better placed than it is to deal effectively with the matter.

9. Today it is widely recognised and also accepted by society that same-sex couples enter into stable relationships. Any absence of a legal framework offering them, at least to a certain extent, the same rights or benefits attached to marriage (see paragraph 4 of this dissent) would need robust justification, especially taking into account the growing trend in Europe to offer some means of qualifying for such rights or benefits.

On a final note, the applicants also claimed the violation of Article 1 of Protocol 1 (i.e. the Right to Property), because of disadvantageous tax treatment but failed to substantiate that more. It could be intresting to see the Court’s evaluation of Article 1 of Protocol 1 in light of same-sex couples not having the same financial benefits as opposite-sex couples do.